NTSB: Signal Failed Before Metro Crash

Signaling equipment that is supposed to detect stopped trains in Washington, D.C., failed periodically in the days leading up to a deadly Metro transit train crash, federal investigators said Wednesday. 

Nine people were killed and more than 70 injured last week when a train slammed into another train stopped on the tracks near the Maryland state line.

The findings by the National Transportation Safety Board are the strongest indication yet that the oncoming train could have lacked information that another train was stopped on the tracks when the June 22 crash occurred.

DC Metro Crash | Mark Rosenker
Mark Rosenker, acting chairman of the NTSB, joined us with more about the department and their role in investigating accidents across the country.
http://www.myfoxdc.com/dpp/news/dc/070209_dc_metro_crash_mark_rosenker

DC Metro Crash | Jim Graham
Chairman of The Metro Board of Directors DC Councilmember Jim Graham with an update on the DC Metro crash investigation.
http://www.myfoxdc.com/dpp/news/dc/070209_dc_metro_crash_jim_graham

The cause of the crash, the deadliest in the rail system's 33-year history, has not been determined.

Investigators have said there is evidence the operator of the train that was moving, Jeanice McMillan, applied the emergency brake before the crash. Her funeral was held Wednesday in New York.

Metro's signaling system is supposed to detect passing trains and transmit speed and stop commands. But the NTSB said problems began occurring after a piece of equipment was replaced June 17, five days before the crash.

The equipment, known as an impedence bond, communicates information such as speed and distance between the tracks, trains and operations control center.

Last week, the NTSB said "anomalies" were found on a stretch of track near the crash, and that the signaling system failed during a test after the accident.

Metro General Manager John Catoe said Wednesday the agency replaced the impedence bond before the accident as part of routine maintenance. He said the post-crash review detected problems that previously went unnoticed.

Data examined in the post-crash review indicate the system would fail to detect a train for a few seconds, and then appeared to work normally, Catoe said.

"This is not an issue that would have been easily detectable to controllers in our operations control center," Catoe said in a statement.

Before the crash, the signaling system was typically tested each month, Catoe said. Reviews are now being performed daily.

Federal investigators also said they plan to conduct "sight distance tests" in about three weeks to help them determine what McMillan would have seen. In those tests, officials will use cars similar to those from the trains in the accident, investigators said.

"There's a tremendous amount of data we have to review," NTSB spokeswoman Bridget Serchak said.

DOCUMENTS OBTAINED BY THE FREDERICK NEWS POST

* Reading from the circuit (B2-304) the stationary train was on; crash occurred about 16:57:03 (PDF)

* Reading from the last circuit (B2-312) that the moving train was traveling on (PDF)

SECOND UPDATE ON NTSB INVESTIGATION INTO COLLISION OF TWO METRORAIL TRAINS IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

In its continuing investigation of the June 22, 2009, accident involving the collision of two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) trains on the Red Line in Washington, D.C., the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:

The examination of factors leading up to the accident continues. Investigators have been conducting nightly tests of the train control system at the accident site. Test progress was delayed by some water in underground access areas that made it unsafe for technicians to work on electrical cables until the water could be pumped out. The components being tested include track impedence bonds, wayside cables, and train control system circuitry for the track segment between the Fort Totten and Takoma stations.

As previously reported, initial testing showed that when the test train was stopped at the same location as the train that was struck in the accident, the train control system lost detection of the test train. Additionally, in subsequent testing over the weekend the train detection system intermittently failed; data is currently being collected to further analyze each component in the train detection system. Investigators are reviewing recorded track circuit data for each test configuration.

Maintenance records show that an impedence bond for the track circuit where the accident occurred was replaced on June 17th, five days before the accident. After a post- accident review of recorded track circuit data, WMATA reported to the NTSB that the track circuit periodically lost its ability to detect trains after June 17th; the NTSB is reviewing documentation on the performance of that track circuit both before and after the June 17th replacement.

The weekend of July